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CONDEMING COLONIZATION: ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN’S REJECTED PROPOSAL FOR A 
CENTRAL AMERICAN COLONY 
 
Matthew Harris 
 
By the second year of the Civil War, the issue of 
racial inequality was not only a critical part of the divided 
country’s domestic feud but also a key component in the 
Union’s foreign policy. Events during the mid-1800’s 
revealed that racial strife and tensions existed not only 
within the warring states but also across the hemisphere. 
Several Central American nations’ rejection of suggested 
Union initiatives showed how intertwined race and politics 
had become after the first year of conflict. 
On August 12, 1862, Abraham Lincoln met with a 
group of former Washington slaves to discuss the future of 
African American society. Lincoln’s initial Emancipation 
Proclamation, which freed every slave in the Confederate 
States of America, was still over a month away. Here, he was 
speaking with a select group of freedmen, hoping to figure 
out the destination of the millions of African Americans, 
whose new future he was privately constructing with 
Congress.1 The problem was that Lincoln did not know what 
to do once all of those people were free. He knew that very 
                                                 
1 Lincoln had begun acquiring funds for a colonial expedition as early 
as March and considering emancipation as early as July; see Roy P. 
Basler, ed., 1861-1862, vol. 5, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 370. 
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soon he was going to free millions of slaves from bondage 
and was desperately concerned about how the country 
should proceed from there. 
 Lincoln’s speech to the freedmen was not long, but it 
held grim tones. He openly admitted that he did not know 
how to best aid African Americans. Just because their 
freedom was near did not mean that they would have a happy 
future. The poor race relations that had, and, he imagined, 
always would, existed between blacks and whites troubled 
Lincoln. He believed that neither group could ever get along: 
“In a word we suffer on each side.”2 Lincoln was thinking 
ahead. Most Unionists did not want to give up their land for 
former slaves, even if they wanted relative equality. One 
possible solution, therefore, was to send them off to establish 
their own country.3 
 Lincoln implored his audience to make sacrifices for 
future generations and set out to establish their own country. 
Liberia was open as a colony to freed American slaves, but 
the country lay across the Atlantic, far from what most 
African Americans considered their home. Most African 
Americans and abolitionists had abandoned the concept of 
colonization, suggesting it was a lazy excuse for not simply 
improving the American social system.4 Thus, Lincoln 
suggested that the freedmen look to nearby Central America 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 371. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A notable opponent to colonization of Liberia was abolitionist 
William Lloyd Garrison, who initially supported resettling the African 
coast but realized that this just pushed the problem of racial equality off 
rather than confronting it head on; see Angela F. Murphy, Jerry Rescue 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 41-42. 
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as their new home. A location that connected both the 
Atlantic and Pacific seemed most suitable to Lincoln, and he 
suggested that it could serve as the hub for transportation 
between Eastern and Western coasts of the United States. 
The president seemed to have a particular spot in mind. The 
meeting closed with Lincoln advising the freedmen to 
consider the proposition. He then assured them that 
resources and government support would always be 
available if they chose to go.5 
The President’s suggestion to send large numbers of 
freed slaves to Central America caused international 
backlash and showed that other countries were still adapting 
to mixed-race societies just as much as the warring United 
States. Two major factors caused Central American 
countries to react with vehemence to Lincoln’s suggestion. 
The first factor was a growing regional unity against foreign 
manipulation, and the second was prevalent racial, social 
structuring that had begun with Spanish colonization 
centuries earlier.  
Lincoln appointed Kansas Senator Samuel Pomeroy 
(also Chair of the Committee on Public Lands) to survey and 
make proposals for land purchases in Central American 
countries.6 Before Pomeroy could make any direct efforts to 
acquire land, multiple United States newspapers published 
                                                 
5 Basler, 1861-1862, 373-374. 
6 Samuel Pomeroy was a Radical Republican who took part in several 
pre-war abolitionist movements such as the New England Emigration 
Aid Company and ‘Bleeding Kansas.’ His viewpoints made him the 
perfect candidate to enthusiastically acquire land for freed slaves; see 
Albert, Castel, “Pomeroy, Samuel Clarke (1816-1891).” Encyclopedia 
of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 
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Lincoln’s speech.7 The news traveled quickly to Central 
America, where the information was republished and 
interpreted in quite a different way. The Central American 
press and public did not view the colonization plan as a mere 
suggestion and found it offensive. The July 20, 1862 edition 
of the Honduras Official Gazette reprinted an article from 
the Boston Daily Advertiser and stated, “They [African 
Americans] desire to emigrate to Central America… they 
desire to bring to the United States that great commerce of 
the Pacific, which ought to increase… the riches and power 
of their common country.”8 Central Americans were 
paranoid that African Americans intended to invade their 
region with the primary goal to bring more prosperity to the 
United States rather than help develop their new homes. 
 Agitation in Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica had already begun with the 
printing of the Honduran article and was building upon 
previously-held worries. Concerns grew regarding a large 
influx of African descendants to the region, along with 
                                                 
7 Northern newspapers widely published this speech in its entirety or as 
a summary with an analysis of Lincoln’s ‘Colonization Scheme.’ For 
example, the Daily Ohio Statesman, which published the speech, and 
the Juliet Signal included an analysis which suggested that the plan 
showed that Lincoln disfavored a mixed-race society; see Daily Ohio 
Statesman (Columbus, Ohio), 22 Aug. 1862, Chronicling America: 
Historic American Newspapers, Library of Congress; Juliet Signal. 
(Juliet [i.e., Joliet], Ill.), 26 Aug. 1862, Chronicling America: Historic 
American Newspapers, Library of Congress. 
8 Message of the President of the United States to the Two Houses of 
Congress at the Commencement of the Third Session of the Thirty-
Seventh Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862), 
892. 
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worries about their allegiance to the United States. Every 
country was loathe to have an intrusive United States colony 
on their borders. The concept for the colony, and Lincoln’s 
speech, had also been published before Pomeroy or 
Secretary of State William Seward announced it to the 
various Central American diplomatic correspondents. The 
agitated public and politicians assumed this meant that the 
United States planned to take land without permission. The 
backlash against the proposal was swift. 
 The Minister to the United States for Guatemala and 
Salvador, Antonio J. Yrisarri, issued a frank statement, 
saying, “Colonization cannot take place, because it does not 
suit the views of those governments.”9 Neither government 
was interested in selling land to another country, and they 
did not want immigrants unless they were educated. 
Immigrants would only be accepted if they were “colonists 
of a different class, who may have had a more liberal 
education than those that can be acquired in a state of 
slavery.”10 The Secretary of Foreign Relations for San 
Salvador and Nicaragua, Pedro Zeledon, had even harsher 
words to say. He thought allowing freed slaves into the 
country would worsen it due to the “degradation of that 
race.” It also was unacceptable for immigrants to act “under 
the special protection of another nation.”11 Not only were 
former slaves not wanted as immigrants, but the idea of 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 895. 
11 Ibid., 896. 
Harris 
52 
 
either of the countries’ governments not having control over 
immigrants to their nations was insulting. 
 Honduras was preemptive in their response, despite 
the fact that no one had even reached out to buy land or 
suggested the idea. Foreign Minister James R. Partridge 
communicated the opinion of the Honduran President. Due 
to the newspapers, the president figured the United States 
should know Honduras’ opinion on the matter of 
colonization and immigration. Honduras only wanted 
“industrious whites” like the “German immigrants… in 
Costa Rica,” who had created prosperity in that country. 
Bringing in freed slaves was “not at all desirable” because 
Honduras already faced problems with their own free 
African population that supposedly refused to be law-
abiding citizens. Just like the representative from San 
Salvador and Nicaragua, the Honduran president said that 
his country would gladly accept educated or industrious 
white immigrants from the United States but wanted no more 
migrants of African descent.12 
 Nicaragua was the most vehemently opposed to the 
colonization of freed slaves in their country. The foreign 
minister of the United States in Leon de Nicaragua, Andrew 
B. Dickinson, communicated with the Nicaraguan 
government and had this to say: “The people of Nicaragua 
are very generally opposed to such a scheme,” and “they feel 
indignant at being ranked with the North American negro.” 
Not only were Nicaraguans against the idea of colonization, 
but they were also completely offended that anyone even 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 891. 
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thought that they should live with or around African 
descendants. The whole of Nicaragua was apparently in a 
panic for several weeks about Lincoln’s proposal. They 
considered it the “greatest degradation for the country to be 
overrun with blacks.”13 In the public mindset “negroes… are 
worthless, idle, thieving vagabonds,” and if they were 
allowed to intermingle with Native Americans they would 
give birth to “the worst cross-breed that society can be 
infested with.” A deep fear that the United States meant to 
upend their society and destroy its fragile racial balance had 
taken hold in Nicaragua.14 
The only country that was open to the idea of 
colonization was Costa Rica. Months earlier, in May, the 
congress of that country began to consider proposals for a 
“tract of land for the settlement of free negroes.”15 This was 
a seemingly independent move from the growing unity of the 
Central American coalition it soon joined. 
 One location, Chiriquí, was perfectly suited for 
Lincoln’s desire to have a trans-oceanic colony and was 
considered perfect for the health of African Americans. The 
problem, however, was that the land was the object of a 
dispute between Costa Rica and New Granada (modern-day 
Colombia). United States Ambassador to Costa Rica Charles 
N. Riotte could not see a peaceful resolution between the two 
countries resulting in a sale to the United States. He also 
could not recommend his government spend “one cent” to 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 893-894. 
14 Ibid., 896. 
15 Ibid., 887. 
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set aside land because the United States “government would 
most surely be swindled” by salesmen and landowners with 
useless property whose sole desire was to make a quick 
profit by setting freedmen up for failure.16  
In other words, the Costa Rican government was 
initially open to colonization, but the United States had to 
both resolve a massive territory dispute and convince the 
winner to sell the highly disputed land, or wade through a 
mire of risky real estate transactions themselves. Costa 
Rica’s consideration of the proposal did not last long, 
though. At the same time, American businessman Ambrose 
W. Thompson also suggested that the United States use a 
large plot of land he owned in the disputed area. This land, 
somewhere between seventy thousand to one million acres, 
(later claimed to be around three million) had been sold to 
Thompson by a French businessman in 1854 and was 
considered for various mining and colonization purposes 
ever since.17 
 A regional effort was assembled to stop the 
colonization plan in mid-September 1862 when Minister 
Luis Molina—a legation of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras—composed a letter to Seward. As the three 
countries’ representative, Molina communicated that no 
country at the meeting “would consent to the formation in its 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 889. 
17 The French had also tried to colonize the land in the 1850s but 
several business and colonization failures led to a buyout by 
Thompson; see Paul J. Scheips, "Gabriel Lafond and Ambrose W. 
Thompson: Neglected Isthmusian Promoters," Hispanic American 
Historical Review 36 no. 2 (May 1956), 212. 
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territory of independent colonies, whatever might be their 
color and place of departure.” None of the countries wanted 
a United States-controlled colony inside their region, no 
matter who was settling it. He also stated that the countries 
did not want an unexpected influx of former slaves, “a 
plague… the United States desire to rid themselves [of].” 
Furthermore, the United States had no claim to the Costa 
Rican land because it had not been sold directly from the 
government to Thompson. Even if it were legal, the land was 
in a disputed zone, so their government could not recognize 
the sale.18 
These five Central American countries had made it 
clear that they were not going to allow a colony in or near 
their borders. A few seemed open to the idea of limited 
African American migration but were still concerned the 
United States might provide too much aid for them.19 United 
States support for the proposal also seemed to dwindle. A 
nationally reprinted article originating from the New York 
Sun compared Lincoln’s attempt to move African Americans 
to another country to that of a beetle trying to move a 
cannonball out of a tire rut.20 The comparison not only 
                                                 
18 Message of the President, 889-900. 
19 This would have included military aid if there were conflicts or 
passive assistance such as food and building materials. Any help, 
however, could have been seen as the United States undermining that 
government’s authority. The migrants to any of these countries would 
have been considered citizens of the countries, and the concept of an 
outside body aiding citizens without permission is interpretable as 
sedition. 
20 The New York Sun was a Republican-leaning paper. Their 
comparison for moving the race issues like trying to move a cannonball 
is similar in philosophy to the rejection of Liberian colonization. The 
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indicated how futile the effort to remove such a massive 
number of people would be, but also that African Americans 
did not wish to leave the country.  
Due to Pomeroy’s continued public organization of 
the project, concerns continued through October 1862 in 
Central America, and Seward had to reaffirm multiple times 
that the United States was not going to settle in Central 
America.21 Even so, the Palace at Managua introduced new 
passport laws in a paranoid attempt to keep former slaves out 
and prevent abolitionists from smuggling them in.22 Why 
were these countries so ardent in their attempt to keep the 
United States and African Americans away from their 
borders? 
Just a decade earlier, filibusters (United States 
citizens who unlawfully invaded other countries with 
military force, such as William Walker) invaded Mexico, 
Central America, and the Caribbean in attempts to acquire 
land and power.23 After failed attempts in Mexico in the 
                                                 
race issues of the United States were there to stay and had to be dealt 
with, not pushed away; see Western Sentinel.(Winston [i.e. Winston-
Salem], N.C.), 03 Oct. 1862, Chronicling America: Historic American 
Newspapers, Library of Congress. 
21 Molina had received word that Pomeroy was travelling around the 
capitol recruiting men for the expedition to found new colony. Landfall 
was meant to be in October, Molina received word in late September. 
At this point it appeared that despite a month of backlash Pomeroy was 
still organizing the colonization plan prolonging the agitation of the 
Central American legation, Seward had to personally contact the 
Department of Interior to halt the efforts; see Message of the President, 
904. 
22 Ibid., 906-907. 
23 For a great source regarding the most famous filibustering cases, see 
Robert E. May, Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in 
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early 1850’s, Walker set out for an assault on Nicaragua in 
1855. Taking advantage of that country’s civil war, he 
managed to secure himself as president of the country for a 
short time before a multi-national armed force removed him 
from power. As president, and during his retreat northward, 
however, he managed to inflict serious damage to the 
reputation of the United States. To make matters worse, 
instead of refuting the actions of the filibuster, President 
Franklin Pierce supported the new Nicaraguan regime when 
he acknowledged its legitimacy.24 Besides how he forcefully 
maintained power, Walker’s actions, such as burning 
Catholic churches, assaulting clergy, and trying to 
reestablish slavery, left Central Americans with a 
horrendous impression of the United States.25  
The negative impression of the United States was 
also exacerbated by the growing slavery tensions in the 
country and the strain on the republican form of government. 
Across Latin America during the 1850’s, Central Americans 
                                                 
Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2002). 
24 Pierce almost immediately rescinded his recognition, however. 
Perhaps the initial recognition seemed to stick with Nicaraguans more 
than his later refutation. Although the United States government 
attempted to prevent filibustering, the country seemed divided on the 
issue and ultimately regional support or opposition dictated what 
parties were able to embark on filibustering expeditions. Walker 
continued filibustering until he was executed by yet another Central 
American defender, Honduras, in 1860; see Kenneth Nivison, 
"Purposes Just and Pacific: Franklin Pierce and the American Empire," 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 21 no. 1 (March 2010), 14-15. 
25 Andrew Denton, "Filibusterism and Catholicity: Narciso López, 
William Walker, and the Antebellum Struggle for America's Souls," 
U.S. Catholic Historian 33 no. 4 (Fall 2015), 11. 
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feared that the United States planned to force its idea of 
democracy southward. Mostly, this fear stemmed from the 
assumption that should the United States acquire any of their 
countries, citizens would not meet the voting requirements 
of a country that seemed to only respect the level of 
whiteness as a prerequisite to political power.26 The majority 
of Central Americans, many being of mixed race with 
varying levels of skin fairness, had only truly begun to 
exercise tentative, democratic rights in the last three decades, 
and the United States’ ‘Manifest Destiny’ loomed as a threat 
to their political autonomy.27 
The resistance to foreign powers in Central America 
was another growing trend during the mid-1800’s that 
seemed to unite the region into a cohesive political entity of 
its own. Elites who had the most influence and power in the 
region adopted the label of Latin America beginning in the 
1840’s. The adoption of a ‘Latin’ identity was not only a 
direct reaction to filibustering but also fear of cultural 
annihilation.28 International racial and political differences 
greatly strained foreign relations as Central America began 
to view itself as a more liberal, democratic entity than the 
United States and European powers, both of which were 
thought to be encroaching on the Latin race. 
Clearly critical to Central America’s rejection of 
colonization or migration was a tremendous amount of 
                                                 
26 Michel Gobat, "The Invention of Latin America: A Transnational 
History of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, and Race," American 
Historical Review 118 no. 5 (December 2013), 1353. 
27Ibid., 1352. 
28 Ibid., 1367. 
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racism and unfounded stereotypes. The countries of Central 
America had shifted towards liberal democratic 
governments during the 1840’s and 1850’s, but with much 
bloodshed. Each country finally established a democratic 
republic, similar to the United States, as their governing 
bodies. However, the notion that African descendants and 
mixed-race peoples would have gained more rights during 
this time of liberal enlightenment is false. In fact, the mid-
1800’s coincided as a time of not only the growth of liberal 
styles of government but also the growth of racist ideology 
across Latin America.29  
While this was many Central Americans’ first chance 
to self-govern, they also used it as an opportunity to exclude 
minorities such as those with large amounts of native or 
African heritage. Elites were afraid of their own level of 
whiteness luring the United States to conquer them, but these 
people used the same racist concept to dictate who had rights 
in their own societies. Central American elites also applied 
the new idea of the Latin race to exclude those from power 
who were not European enough. The rejection of mixed 
races was a direct counter to global concerns of the 
Americas’ ‘mongrelization’: the mixture of so many very 
different racial groups. To combat this, elites attempted to 
portray themselves as pure descendants of Spain and France 
rather than a mixed culture of Europeans, Natives, and 
Africans.30 
                                                 
29 David Cook-Martin and David FitzGerald, "Culling the Masses: A 
Rejoinder," Ethnic and Racial Studies 38 no. 8 (June 2015), 1323. 
30 Gobat, The Invention, 1355. 
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Elites’ rejection of mixed race society in Central 
America also became blended with abuse and intolerance of 
those they perceived as inferior. Black and mixed-race 
people were seen as having only negative qualities, as the 
communications with the various foreign ministers had 
previously suggested. The mistreatment of mixed race 
individuals was probably a direct mimicry of American and 
European practices, once again trying to illustrate how Latin 
American elites were just as white as any other European 
descendant. The abuse that the lower classes suffered 
resulted in violent outbursts that often worsened the strain 
between elite and commoner.  
Latin American elites feared these riots and revolts. 
In many places, former slaves or mixed-race peoples 
outnumbered elite whites dramatically. The fear of being 
massacred and overwhelmed by the lower classes was not a 
groundbreaking idea in the 1860s. Revolutionary general 
and political leader Símon Bolívar had feared the same in the 
1820s following Bolivia’s independence. Even after having 
large numbers of mixed race people, or, as he referred to 
them, pardos, serve in his army, he did not want to give them 
many rights following independence from Spain.31 He 
ensured that the same class-based system endured through 
the wars of revolution, at least in his country. His reiteration 
of old Spanish caste ideas gave the system longevity through 
the Latin American independence movements of the early 
                                                 
31 Aline Helg, "Simon Bolivar and the Spectre of 'Pardocracia': Jose 
Padilla in Post-Independence Cartagena," Journal of Latin American 
Studies 35, no. 3 (August 2003): 454, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3875308. 
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nineteenth century. These ideas lingered for decades and 
strengthened once more in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Bolívar’s fear was the rise of a pardocracia, or a 
society ruled by the pardos, where whites and elites would 
be exterminated and stripped of all power. For years he 
attempted to maintain a government where pardos were 
seemingly equal but not equal enough to impact the 
government or topple the elite system.32 As one of the most 
influential revolutionaries and writers in the post-colonial 
Americas, Bolívar was undoubtedly influential in Central 
America during the 1860s. If his ideas on race and fear of 
pardocracia were not direct causes of the racist ideology of 
the region, they at least affirmed that elites’ fears of lower 
classes and non-whites were well founded. Consistent racial 
and class conflict post-independence also seemed to lend 
credence to some of Bolívar’s ideas. 
One such example is when poor laborers and former 
slaves in La Ciėnega, Panama, rose up in violent protest and 
destroyed several U.S. buildings.33 The protests were a direct 
reaction to local Panamanians losing their jobs to transport 
industries on the isthmus such as railroads and steamships 
after formerly using man and mule power to transport cargo 
and people.34 Industrialization took away traditional jobs 
such as these, and the workers’ reactions to the changes 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Daley Chen Mercedes, "The Watermelon Riot: Cultural Encounters 
in Panama City, 1856," The Hispanic American Historical Review, 
1990, 86-87. 
34 The term Panamanian is used, but at the time the isthmus was still 
owned by New Granada. Ibid., 89. 
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explain why elites viewed the mixed races not only as 
violent, but also lazy. More than likely, white elites confused 
lack of work and job opportunities, especially for poor 
laborers, with laziness. In actuality, the beginning of the 
Industrial Revolution had put more strain on an already 
heavily-bowed system of social inequality. The racism 
shown in the communications between the U.S. and Central 
America resulted from a lack of privileges and the lack of 
knowledge for modern, industrial jobs slowly replacing 
traditional ones. The supposedly-liberal governments of 
Central America actively oppressed instead of liberated. 
Africans and natives were not violent and lazy but were 
subjects to a region that refused to modernize a large group 
of its population with obvious negative outcomes that were 
viewed as racial inferiority, rather than government 
incompetence. 
Each Central American country stood ardently in 
their rejection of United States colonization to the region. 
Fear of the United States encroaching onto their territory 
made each country extremely hesitant to negotiate land 
terms after a decade of filibustering and inter-American 
violence. To Central America, the United States had 
morphed from a role model into a hovering menace whose 
government and people could bear down on their countries 
at any moment. 
The racial climate in Central America proved 
unforgiving of the proposal. The cultures of the area had 
been built around race and class. The formation of a Latin 
American identity bolstered the attempts of elites to portray 
themselves as white and reject mixed race and mixed culture 
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society. These elites viewed Black and mixed-race 
individuals as inferior, despite playing a large part in their 
unemployment through the introduction of industry without 
proper education. 
Lincoln’s ‘scheme’ to colonize freed slaves into 
Central America had been a disaster. Seward and his 
ambassadors worked throughout the fall of 1862 to ensure 
that good relations were maintained with Central America. 
The United States, in the midst of its bloodiest conflict, could 
not afford to break friendships with even the smallest of 
countries. The ultimate question, what to do with all of the 
freed African Americans, had to wait. Even this small 
attempt to answer it had kicked off an international panic and 
threatened the United States with diplomatic retaliation. 
International tensions and cultural phenomena in Central 
America prevented any possible settlement and caused 
Lincoln’s first colonization plan to fail. 
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